THE JURISPRUDENCE OF BUSING
OWEN

M. FISS*

School desegregation decrees have become a familiar part of the contemporary judicial landscape, and yet they remain enmeshed in controversy. These
decrees have engendered two types of criticism. One is addressed to the merits
and asserts that segregation is not sufficiently harmful to warrant the costs of
busing. Another type of criticism, and the subject of this article, is institutional.
It focuses on the predicate of decision-the judgment that segregation is sufficiently harmful to warrant the remedial costs; it notes the controversial character of that judgment; and it then asserts that a court should not coerce corrective action whenever its decision rests on such an uncertain basis.
This strain of institutional criticism has its roots in the attacks on Brown v.
Board of Education that claimed that the decision was "sociology, not law," seizing on footnote eleven of that opinion, in which the Court referred to certain
social science studies.1 It is a line of criticism that has gained additional momentum as the nature of the school desegregation problem has changed and as the
uncertainty has become more acute. My intent is to evaluate this criticism. As
a first step, and in order to locate the sources of uncertainty, I will try to structure a desegregation decision.
I
THE STRUCTURE OF DECISION

A decree imposes a legal obligation to take corrective action. It must be
predicated on the proposition (referred to as the underlying proposition) that
the practice to be corrected or eliminated is sufficiently harmful that it justifies the consequent costs entailed in complying with the order. Other conditions might also have to be satisfied-for example, the judge must also find
that the state is responsible for the harmful practice-but the proposition asserting that the harm is sufficient to justify the remedial costs is the necessary
decisional predicate. This is a statement of ideal and expectation: what should
be the basis of the decision and what usually is.
The underlying proposition can, in turn, be divided into three components
that identify the range of judgments a court must make before relief is
granted. First, the judge must identify and assess the harmfulness of the prac* Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. See 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). For an extensive bibliography and useful discussion of the
footnote eleven attack, see P. ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1972); Goodman,
De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275, 278-83
(1972).
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tice to be corrected (the harmfulness component); second, he must identify and
assess the remedial costs (the remedial-cost component); and third, he must
determine whether the harm is sufficient to justify the remedial costs (the
relational component).
These are the judgments that must be made in every injunctive suit, even
one based on the Constitution. The Constitution does not restrict the range of
judgments. It does not make any of the components superfluous. Rather the
Constitution operates within each component. It requires that the harm be of a
certain character, it precludes the consideration of certain remedial costs, and it
defines the nature of the relationship that must exist between the harm and the
costs.
A. The Character of the Harm
Since a school decree seeks to implement the Equal Protection Clause, the
target practice must not just be harmful, but particularly harmful to some
identifiable class. It is this class-oriented quality of the harm that enables it to
be perceived as a form of unequal treatment, and thus a subject of concern
under the Equal Protection Clause.
There is some dispute as to which social classes are to be so shielded by the
Equal Protection Clause. For example, should the Clause protect such classes as
the "poor" or "illegitimate children" from particularly disadvantaging practices? But there is no dispute that wherever the line is drawn, blacks-the class
allegedly injured in a desegregation suit-must be included. Both the historical
origins of the Equal Protection Clause and the identity of blacks as a discrete
class-indeed, as the perpetual underclass-suggest that blacks should be con2
sidered the prime beneficiary of that Clause.
B.

The Relevance of Remedial Costs

The relevance of remedial costs is often obscured in constitutional litigation.
It is commonly asserted that violation of a "constitutional right" must be corrected regardless of the cost. Indeed, vindication-at-any-cost is often thought to
be one of the special attributes of a right deemed "constitutional." This conceptualization may be appropriate for a narrow band of constitutional provisions,
those that specifically confer a readily discernible right-such as the provision
guaranteeing trial by jury-though even then a court may take account of the
remedial costs in defining the incidents of the right-such as the number of
jurors required 3 or the unanimity requirement. 4 But for constitutional provi2.

The

classic statement of this position is contained in the Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16

Wall.) 36, 71-72 (1873), and has been repeated on many occasions. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112, 126-27 (1970); Shelley %v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1,23 (1948).
3. See, e.g., Williams v.Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
4. See, e.g..
(1972).

Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972);

Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356
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sions like the due process or equal protection clauses the remedial costs are
clearly relevant in determining whether there is a violation. With these provisions, the judiciary has considerable latitude in shaping the contours of a "constitutional right"-in determining whether segregation is to be deemed a denial
of the equal protection of the laws and whether blacks have a "constitutional
right" to have the system integrated. In making that judgment, the court must
not only consider the harmfulness of the particular practice being challenged
but also whether it is sufficiently harmful to warrant the costs of eliminating it.
Not all costs should be taken into consideration in deciding whether to
invalidate a particular practice. A distinction must be made between allowable
and non-allowable costs. The paradigmatic instance of an allowable cost would
be the time and money consumed in busing. The psychic costs imposed on
white racists who wish to keep blacks in a position of subordination would be a
paradigmatic instance of a non-allowable cost.5 A non-allowable cost has two
defining features: (a) allowance would, as a practical matter, result in the continued subordination of the racial minority; and (b) the existence and magnitude of these costs are subject to individual control. The recognition of costs
that have such qualities would be inconsistent with a central purpose of the
Equal Protection Clause, and for that matter would also be inconsistent with
the very idea of a constitutional restraint. The restraint would become dependent on the consent of those being restrained. If the psychic costs of the racist,
for example, were considered an allowable cost and thus a restraint on remedial efforts, an incentive would be created for the racist to constantly escalate
his hostility to blacks, at least until it is sufficient to stop the remedial effort.
The remedial costs of a busing decree, of course, do not categorize themselves as "allowable" and "non-allowable." That task of categorization is for the
court, and often it is exceedingly difficult. This is particularly true of the
remedial cost of greatest concern to those most interested in preserving the
value of community-the disruptive impact of a busing decree on a neighborhood. For the community may be in part defined in terms of racial antipathy,
an associational preference that, if it were standing alone, should be deemed
non-allowable. In such a situation, the court must try to disaggregate the interests and preferences served by the demand to preserve the integrity of the
community, determine which are allowable and which non-allowable, and make
an assessment of the role that each one performs-obviously a treacherous
task.
The distinction between allowable and non-allowable remedial costs is
further blurred by the fact that the latter costs cannot be totally ignored. The
frustration of racist associational preferences may, for example, result in temporary boycotts, permanent withdrawal from the public school system, and
5. See generally Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1
(1958); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
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violence-activities that limit the capacity of the court to eliminate the practice.
Perhaps the most that can be said is that these non-allowable costs have a
practical relevance, not a normative one. Non-allowable costs should not bear
upon the creation and enforcement of rights and duties, although they may do
so out of sheer necessity.
C.

The Nature of the Relational Judgment

The judge must consider not only allowable remedial costs but, more importantly, he must conclude that they are justified by the eradication of the
harm (the benefit). Two factors make this relational judgment particularly
difficult. First, it calls for a comparison between the costs of the harm and those
of the remedy even though these costs are not reducible to a single currency.
Without a rate of exchange, a judge is faced with an apples-and-orange situation: how does he compare, for example, the dignitary harm of segregation
6
with the costs of a school busing program? Second, there is no clear understanding of the relationship that must exist between the harm and the remedial
costs. It is clear that the harm must be "sufficient to justify" the remedial costs;
but this concept is notably open-ended and susceptible to several interpretations.
If the harm is greater than the remedial costs, then the decree would seem
justified. That would make a "greater-than" relationship a sufficient condition.
7
The troublesome question is whether it is also a necessary condition. Three
features of the school desegregation problem lead me to a negative answer: (1)
The claim is not merely that the practice is harmful, but that it is particularly
harmful to one of our worst-off classes, blacks. (2) The remedial costs are
spread generally through society, borne by both the minority and the majority.' (3) The decrees are predicated on the Equal Protection Clause whose
guarantee seems to have constitutionalized a distributional preference. It prohibits the maximization of total welfare at the expense of the racial minority,
or, to put the same point somewhat differently, it requires-in addition to
An objection to transportation of students may have validity when the time or distance
of travel is so great as to either risk the health of the children or significant]) impinge on
the educational process. District courts must weigh the soundness of any transportation
It hardly needs stating that the limits on time of travel will vary with many
plan ....
factors, but probably with none more than the age of the students. The reconciliation of
competing values in a desegregation case is, of course, a difficult task with many sensitive
facets but fundamentally no more so than remedial measures courts of equity have traditionally employed.
Swann v. Charlotte- Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1971).
7. Although these factors are not quantifiable, assume that the remedial costs were 300. There
seems little doubt that a decree would be justified if the harm of the challenged practice were 500.
The question posed here is whether the harm must be greater than 300 (the amount assigned to the
remedial costs) in order for the decree to be justified.
8. The Supreme Court, by generally limiting the remedy to within-district busing, Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), may have introduced an economic bias into the remedy-its costs fall
on those not wealthy enough to move out of the district into the suburbs.
6.
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the non-allowance of certain costs-the elimination of practices harmful to
a racial minority, even at the expense of the polity as a whole.
For these reasons, the controlling standard should be one that requires not
that the harm be greater than the remedial costs, but that the remedial costs
not be "excessive"-not out of proportion to the harm. 9 Under this standard of
proportionality, the visual image of the structure of the judicial decision is not
one of "balancing," but rather one of having the harm-the fact that the challenged practice particularly disadvantages blacks-serve as a triggering mechanism, the impetus for relief, and having the remedial costs serve as the
restraining force. The remedial effort is not brought to a halt when the remedial costs become greater than the harm but only when those costs become
excessive.
The judgment as to whether the remedial costs are excessive turns on the
quality and quantity of harm, but not exclusively so. A judgment must also be
made about alternative remedies. The judge must have some sense of the
relationship between the harm and the remedial costs of alternative remedies
before he decides whether the remedial costs of a decree he is contemplating
are out of proportion to the harm. If an alternative remedy would eliminate
the same amount of harm at less cost, then that remedy seems preferable.'
The court need not choose the remedy that has the best cost-benefit relationship since it may eliminate a smaller portion of the harm. But, on the other
hand, the cost-benefit relationship of alternative remedies is not tendered totally irrelevant by the Equal Protection Clause. An enormous saving in remedial costs might be worth a slight decrease in the total amount of harm
eliminated."1
In making these judgments about alternative remedies, the judge must
9. The same general point could be accommodated under a "greater-than" standard if the
minority interests were weighted, or if some value equal to the benefit society would receive from
the elimination of the harm were either added to the minority-harm side or subtracted from the
remedial-cost side. I am not sure that there are any advantages to be gained front these alternatives, and indeed, explicit weighting might have undesirable symbolic consequences.
10. For example, suppose the harm were 100; the remedial costs of one decree (decree A) were
300; but of another one (decree B) were 200. If both eliminate the same 100 harm, obviously B
would be preferable. Similarly, if a cash payment of $150 (the gilded-ghetto strategy) truly compensated for the 100 units of hari and if it were less costly than either decree A or B-with no
monetary value as yet placed on either decree-then the cash payment would be preferable. Of
course, it is doubtful that the remedial costs could be translated into monetary terms. ot that
money would adequately compensate for the harm.
11. In Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 377 F. Stipp. 1123 (M.D. Ala. 1974),aff'd per
curtiam, 511 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1975), District judge Frank Johnson rejected plaintiff's plea for
greater desegregation, citing to "an excessive and unnecessarily heavy administrative burden" that
the plan would place on the school system. 377 F. Stipp. at 1129. In Northcross v. Board of Educ.
of Memphis Schools, 489 F.2d 15 (6th Cir. 1973), cerl. denied. 414 U.S. 1022 (1974), the additional
transportation time required for 100 per cent desegregation led the court to affirm approval of a
plan that left nineteen all-black or predominantly black schools, including some that wsere all-black
at the inception of the litigation in 1960. See also Goss v. Knoxville Bd. of Educ., 482 F.2d 1044 (6th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1171 (1974); Mapp v. Board of Educ., 477 F.2d 851 (6th Cir.
1973). cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1022 (1974).
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consider alternative decrees. He must consider different types of school decrees (for example, pairing versus rezoning) and perhaps even decrees that
seek to eliminate the segregated residential patterns themselves. 2 In addition,
the judge might even consider the possibility of relying upon remedies that
are within the control of other agencies, such as the state education authority.
In such an instance, where the alternative remedy is beyond his control, the
judge must speculate both about the efficacy of the alternative remedy and
the probability of it being utilized.
II
THE GROWING

UNCERTAINTY

The uncertainty that surrounds desegregation decrees is introduced
primarily at two points in the judicial decision-in the harmfulness component
and the relational component. How harmful is the challenged practice? Is it
sufficiently harmful to justify the remedial costs? Twenty years ago those
judgments might have been difficult enough. In recent years the difficulty has
only grown.
A.

The New Harmful Practice

In Brown there were two possible candidates for the harmful practice-the
assignment of students to schools on the basis of race, and the segregated

pattern of student assignment itself. Both phenomena were present in the
dial school system. Today, the typical situation is one in which students are
assigned not on the basis of race but on the basis of geographic proximityyet the resulting pattern of student attendance is segregated.13 Hence there
12. See, for example, Judge Weinstein's initial order in Hart v. Community School Bd. of
Brooklvn, 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal disnissed, 497 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir.),order amended, 383 F.
Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). In that case judge Weinstein ordered that the school be desegregated
and referred the matter to a special master. The responsibility for racial segregation was thought to
be two-fold:
[A]ction or inaction by the school loard; and action by the housing authorities which
greatly increased the proportion of black and Puerto Rican families, particularly as a
proportion of families with children in what had been a predominantly white neighborhood. Because of this the court, although finding "liability" solely on the part of the school
authorities. considered it appropriate to impose duties on the housing officials as well, and
indeed in addition on the Police Commissioner. the Commissioner of Recreation, and the
Mietropolitan Transit Authority . . . . Housing officials of the city,state, and federal
governments were directed to provide a joint plan so designed that ...
the area would be
"refertilized with new families.'
497 F.2d at 1029-30. judge Weinstein, however, subsequently amended his order with respect to
housing and other non-school authorities, albeit leaving open the possibility of post-judgment
orders in this area. 383 F. Supp. at 775.

13. 1 do not dely the possibility of gerrymandering (assignments purporting to be made on the
basis of geographic criteria, but in truth made on the basis of race). Not do I deny that gerrymandering might exist in many school systems throughout the nation. On the other hand, I do not
believe that in any single district in which there is residential segregation will gerrymandering be
the cause-in any direct contemporary sense-of the overall demographic school pattern of segregation in that district. In such a situation, gerrymandering usually accounts for the racial composition of the schools along the horders of the residential neighborhoods.
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is only one candidate for the harmful practice that is the target of the contemporary school desegregation decree-the segregated pattern of student
attendance, not racial assignment.
The courts still talk about racial assignment, but that is not the harmful
practice that is the predicate of the corrective obligation. The courts are referring to past racial assignment and by definition that practice is at an end. Admittedly, a contemporary vestige of a harmful practice can be the target of a
corrective order and whenever the Supreme Court has affirmed busing decrees it has spoken of segregation as a vestige of past racial assignment. 1 4 But
even if this language were to be taken at face value,15 and the judge were to
deem the segregation of a particular district a vestige of past racial assignment, he must still decide whether that segregation is harmful. If it is not,
there is no point in eradicating it. A practice that is itself a vestige of another
harmful but earlier practice can indeed get some "help" from that earlier practice-perhaps the later practice need not be as harmful as it might otherwise
have to be were it standing alone, and it might not itself have to constitute
a form of unequal treatment since the violation of the Equal Protection Clause
would be the earlier, sufficiently harmful practice of which it is a vestige. But
the present practice that is the target of the decree must to some degree also
be regarded as harmful in and of itself in order that the corrective obligation
be intelligible.
B.

The Sources of Doubt-The Harmfulness Component

A theory can be articulated to explain why segregation is particularly harmful to blacks, and that theory need not be dependent upon a claim that race is
the criterion of assignment, or that it is believed to be the criterion of assignment. That theory consists of three propositions: (1) Segregation is a badge of
inferiority-it stigmatizes blacks. The assertion is that this stigmatization occurs
regardless of the method of assignment. Racial assignment would give rise to it,
but so would the use of geographic criteria when segregation is the foreseeable
and avoidable result. (2) Segregation deprives blacks of valuable contacts with
the educationally, socially, and economically dominant group, and thereby
perpetuates their subordinate position. (3) Segregation has the inevitable effect
of reducing the financial and physical resources available to all-black schools
because these schools are attended only by members of the least powerful
group.
The question, of course, is whether these assertions are true. We seem to
have increasing doubts that they are, and thus we have grown more uncertain
in our belief that segregation is harmful. Part of this change may be based on
See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
I have argued elsewhere that this language should not be taken at face value. Fiss, School
Desegregation: The Uncertain Path of the Law, 4 PHILOSOPHY AND PUB. AFFAIRS 3, 19-26 (1974).
14.
15.
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the merits-a systematic review of the evidence reveals that our previous beliefs
were mistaken. But I suspect that other, more extraneous factors have been
controlling.
First, there is no longer a consensus in the relevant academic professions as
to the harmfulness of segregation, and that change may not be attributable
primarily to the state of the evidence. As Robert Crain recently stated:' 6 twenty
years ago there was no respectable social science evidence tending to show that
segregation was harmful, and yet social scientists were nearly unanimous in
believing that it was. Today there is respectable evidence tending to show that it
is harmful, but no one in the profession believes it. This phenomenon, Crain
speculated, is due to an increasing concern in the profession for methodological perfection, almost for its own sake, and also to the growing disbelief in the
possibility of social betterment through government intervention-a disbelief
not confined to social scientists nor to the problem of school desegregation.
Second, the escalation of the remedial costs has caused us to scrutinize our
beliefs about the harmfulness of the challenged practice with greater care.
When the harmful practice was racial assignment, or the segregation caused by
racial assignment, the remedial costs were essentially non-allowable. The remedial order-prohibiting the use of race as the basis for assigning pupils to
schools-would do no more than frustrate the associational desires served by
the use of the racial criterion and require the school board to adopt an alternative, non-racial method of student assignment. But once the perceived harmful
practice became segregation attributable to the use of neighborhood school assignment policies, the typical (though by no means the only) remedial order
had to be a busing decree. This remedy consumes fiscal resources of the community (including those that otherwise might be spent. on education), exposes
children to safety hazards, reduces the time available for classes, and loses
whatever psychological or emotional advantages might arise from having all
the children in a neighborhood attend the school identified with that neighborhood.' 7 An awareness of these allowable costs gives rise to some second
thoughts about the harmfulness of segregation. We naturally tend to ask
whether segregation is that harmful, and begin to wonder if it is harmful at all.
Third, there is no longer a consensus in the black community itself that
segregation (or to put it more neutrally, that the all-black school) is harmful.
Once again this may be traced to factors other than social science evidence.
Some blacks have raised their voices against integration because of its conflict
with the ideal of self-determination-most concretely embodied in the demand
for community-controlled schools, which would leave the segregation of the

16. Statement made at The Courts, Social Science, and School Desegregation Conference,
Hilton Head Island, S.C., Aug. 20. 1974, on file at Law and Contemporaly Problems office.
17. There may be some doubt as to whether these costs to the community are allowable, see text
at p. 196, supra, and that, too. may be another source of the growing uncertainty.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 39: No. I

all-black school intact, albeit within a school district that blacks controlled. 18
Others are concerned with the racist strains inherent in the typical method of
achieving integration-one-way busing-by which blacks are bused to the traditional white schools without a reciprocal obligation being imposed on whites. "
Others are offended by the racist implication of one strand of the theory
against segregation-that blacks will learn better when they are in a setting
dominated by the more academically advantaged and ambitious whites."0 And
still other members of the black community may be concerned with the diversion of resources inherent in any busing program, and insist that those resources be used for more traditional academic purposes.2 1
Fourth, the increased doubts about the harmfulness of school desegregation

can be linked to the proliferation of antidiscrimination remedies in other areas,
such as housing and employment. Federal fair housing and employment laws
now apply to the private sector, and are being enforced more vigorously than
before. These laws enhance residential mobility for blacks, and thus lend credence to the claim that many blacks choose to live in all-black neighborhoods. 2
That supposition in turn calls into question some aspects of the traditional
theory against segregation. If, for example, the all-black residential pattern
18. See, e.g., Brief for CORE as Amicus Curiae, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of' Educ.,
402 U.S. 1 (1971); Oliver v. Donovan, 293 F. Supp. 958 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (Ocean Hill-Brownsville);
Hamilton, Race and Education: A Search for Legitimacy, 38 HARV. ED. REV. 671 (1968); Bell, School
Litigation Strategies Jor the 1970's: New Phases in the Continuing Quest for Quality Schools, 1970 Wis. L.
REV. 257.
19. See, e.g., Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 423 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1970).
20. See, e.g., the statement made by Roy Innis, Director of the Congress of Racial Equality, that
school integration is a "bankrupt, suicidal method ... based on the false notion that black children
are unable to learn unless the), are in the same setting as white children." N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1972.
at 30, col. 4. Cf Brunson v. Board of Trustees of School Dist. No. 1, 429 F.2d 820, 826 (4th Cir.
1970) (concurring opinion), in which Judge Sobeloff rejects the implication that Brown stood for
the proposition that "association with white pupils helps the blacks," or that "white children are a
precious resource which should be fairly apportioned" and that "black children will be improved
by association with their betters." See note 21 infra.
21.
Edmonds,judicialAssumptions on the Value of Integrated Educationjor Blacks, in D. BitL., RACE,
RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (1973).

22. See also Craven, The Impact of Social Science Evidence on the Judge: A Personal Comment, 39 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. no. I, at 150, 155 (1975). But see Farley, Residential Segregation ansd Its Implicationsfor School Integration, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. nss. 1, 164, (1975).
Many commentators have argued that the device of zoning has been used to exclude minorities
and the poor. See generally R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: LAND USE
REGULATION AND HOUSING IN THE 1970s (1973). See also U.S. COMMtISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA (1974); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection,
and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969). In recent years, exclusionary zoning has come under
heavy judicial attack. See, e.g., Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973); Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208
(8th Cir. 1972); Providence of St. Mary of the Woods v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396 (N.D.
Ill. 1971); Kennedy Park lomes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanner, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Southern Burlington Co. NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel,
N.J.
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were truly voluntary, school segregation would not as readily be perceived as a
dignitary harm. Similarly, if blacks chose not to move to an integrated district,
it would become increasingly difficult to argue that integrated education is
preferable. I do not suggest that these housing and employment laws have now
made the choice of residence truly voluntary, or that there are not other noneducational reasons for keeping one's residence in all-black neighborhoods.
Instead I am suggesting that the increased availability of housing and employment laws, like the black nationalist assertions, have begun to call into question
the earlier assumption that the residential patterns are involuntary, and that
the all-black area is a ghetto-an assumption that was a basis for our beliefs that
school segregation is particularly harmful to blacks.
C.

The Sources of Doubt-The Relational Component

Much of the uncertainty has developed in connection with the harmfulness
component. But several of the factors that generate uncertainty concerning the
harmfulness of segregation have also made the relational judgment more difficult. A second locus of uncertainty has thus been created. Even if one agrees
that segregation is harmful, the question must then be faced whether it is
"sufficiently" harmful to 'justify" the costs of eliminating it.
The increase in the allowable remedial costs has not only caused us to be
more careful in judgments about the harmfulness of segregation, but also
made the relational judgment more problematic. If there are no allowable
remedial costs, then the remedial judgment is straightforward. The relief
can be predicated exclusively on the conclusion that the challenged practice
is harmful. But the situation changes once the remedial costs become allowable. Then the judge must confront the difficulty of weighing noncomparable
factors-the harm and the remedial costs-and of applying the ambiguous
proportionality standard. The difficulty is further compounded by the increased availability of employment and housing remedies, alternatives that
might be less costly than a busing decree. While these remedies are not likely
to achieve the same degree of integration within the same time span, they
cannot be totally disregarded. Time may be considered as just another cost
in the judicial calculus, and in any event the prospect of instant integration
by way of a busing decree may be illusory. Whites have the capacity--constitutionally enhanced by the Supreme Court in Milliken v. Bradley and Pierce
v. Society of Sisters-to insulate themselves from the busing decree by enrolling in private schools2 3 or by moving to predominantly white school districts.
From this perspective, housing and employment remedies become more com23. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
But seeCraven, supra note 22, at 155, indicating that "the silence" of the majority in Milliken,
coupled with Justice Marshall's dissent, may mean "that white flight can never be a relevant factor
in considering the appropriate remedy for dismantling a dual school system ...."
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parable and the choice between them and the busing decree therefore more
difficult.
III
THE AVOIDANCE STRATEGY

Although the contemporary context is characterized by a growing doubt as
to the harmfulness of segregation and by an increased awareness of both the
need to make an explicit relational judgment and the difficulty of that judgment, these factors have not precluded the issuance of desegregation decrees.
They have meant, however, that once issued, a significant residue of uncertainty remains. The judge believes the underlying proposition to be true-that
the segregation is sufficiently harmful to warrant the remedial costs of

busing-but he cannot in good conscience deny the possibility that he may be
wrong. Some element of uncertainty is present in every instance of judicial
law-making. The argument made by the critics of busing, however, is that in

this area of decision the uncertainty is sufficiently "high" to make it inappropriate for a court-perceived as a very distinctive social institution-to issue the
order.
The initial response to this criticism has not been confrontation, but
avoidance. The institutional criticism has not been evaluated; instead, it has

uncritically been assumed to be valid, and ways have been sought to make the
judgments about the harmfulness of segregation appear more certain. The

strategy has been one of deempiricalizing the harmfulness component-of trying to make assertions about the harmfulness of segregation rest on a nonempirical base, divorced from the findings of social scientists. This strategy has
taken several forms. One builds on the contemporary consensus that racial
assignment to segregate is wrongful and seeks to conceptualize segregation as a
"vestige" of past racial assignment. 24 Another has been to postulate a valuesuch as "universalistic ethic" (making it a good to eliminate barriers among
groups)-that is necessarily inconsistent with segregation. 25 I find the avoidance strategy unappealing in either of its guises.
A.

The Conceptual Flaws

The avoidance strategy seeks to eliminate uncertainty by freeing the harmfulness judgment from a dependence on the outcomes of social science research. As such, it rests on two questionable premises: (1) uncertainty is exclusively, or at least primarily, introduced by the harmfulness judgment; and (2)
the truth of assertions concerning the harmfulness of segregation depend on
the outcomes of social science research.
24. This is the strategy chosen by the Supreme Court in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), and Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). The doctrinal
complexities of these cases are analyzed in detail in the article referred to in Fiss, supra note 15.
25. See Yudof, Equal EducationalOpportunity and the Courts, 51 TEXAS L. REv. 411, 456-64 (1973).
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The first premise, which explains why the avoidance strategy concentrates
on the harmfulness component, ignores the large measure of uncertainty introduced by the relational component. Even if segregation can be classified as a
vestige of past discrimination or as a wrong because it violates the universalistic
ethic, the task of determining whether it is sufficiently harmful to warrant the
remedial costs still remains. This determination not only requires an assessment
of both the remedial costs and the harm but also a comparison of the two and
an application of the vague proportionality standard.
We tended to ignore the relational judgment when the harmful practice was
racial assignment-its wrongful quality alone seemed a sufficient basis to
grant relief. For that reason, the avoidance effort seeks to construct a theory
that would make segregation of the schools as wirongful as assignment to schools
on the basis of race. This is done with the hope that the same automatic connection between the harm (or wrong) and the remedy will be created, thereby
eliminating the need for the relational judgment. But it won't work. Even if
a segregated pattern of school attendance-attributable solely to the assignment of students to schools on the basis of geographic criteria-can be given
the same moral status as racial assiignments designed to segregate, the parallelism breaks down on the remedial side. In such a system, which is the typical
one today, the remedial costs are likely to be pronounced; that fact makes
the relational judgment at once necessary and extremely problematic. Deempiricalizing the harmfulness component can make no contribution toward
2 6'
the elimination of that uncertainty.
The second premise-positing that judgments about the harmfulness of
segregation depend on the uncertain outcomes of social science research-is
also mistaken. It reflects either a misunderstanding of the epistemological
character of the assertions underlying the theory of the harmfulness of segregation or an exaggerated notion of the reach of the social sciences. Admittedly
the traditional theory embraces assertions that might be susceptible to methods
of social science research. The assertion that integration will improve the
achievement and aspiration levels of blacks is such an instance. But the theory
also includes assertions that are beyond the reach of social science, and in that
sense, nonempirical. An example would be the assertion that, regardless of the
'2 7
method of assignment, segregation is a "living insult to blacks.
26. Professor Yudof seems to give the remedial costs a role in the choice of competing ethics,
but no role once the universalistic ethic is adopted:

Because the), [the universalistic ethic, and what is conceived to be the competing value, the
racial-neutrality principle] both embody a morality "of excellence, of the fullest rcalizations of human powers," these two principles fall within what Fuller terms the "morality of
aspiration" rather than within the "morality of duty." According to Professor FIller, -[o]n
the level of duty, anything like economic calculation is out of place. In a morality of
aspiration, it is not only in place, but becomes an integral part of the moral decision itself."
Yudof, supna note 25, at 462 n. 266 (citation omitted).
27. "[Slchool desegregation is forbidden simply because its perpetuation is a living insult to ...
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One can speak of an assertion about dignitary harm as being true or false,
but its truth or falsehood cannot conclusively be determined on the basis of
discrete, observable events and behavior that are the province of social science
research. A dignitary harm may have psychological consequences but it is not
reducible to those consequences. Nor can the truth of an assertion about dignitary harm conclusively be determined on the basis of a questionnaire addressed to the alleged victims, even assuming a method can be devised for
making certain that the responses to the questionnaire are sincere. Such a
questionnaire might be illuminating, but not decisive. I say this for two reasons.
First, there is no intellectual mechanism for resolving conflicts in responses that
would be able to cope with the likely situation of nonunanimity (where some
blacks say that they are insulted and others deny it). Secondly, the concept of a
dignitary harm has built into it some understanding of what the appropriate or
"reasonable" response should be. The statement "I am insulted" is neither a
necessary nor sufficient condition for concluding that a particular practice
inflicts dignitary harm: even assuming-unrealistically-that this statement is
unanimously made by blacks in the face of segregation, it is always possible to
claim, in the style of Plessy v. Ferguson,28 that they are oversensitive; and if the
contrary statement is unanimously made, it is always possible to claim that they
are undersensitive. The "right" degree of sensitivity cannot be fixed in some
conclusive manner by averaging prevailing practices. In the final analysis, it
is always possible for the judge, as an impartial spectator, to imagine himself
in the place of the alleged victim and to ask whether he would be insulted by
the challenged practice.
I do not mean to suggest that the theory against segregation should be
reduced to the assertion about dignitary harm, or that the assertion is unquestionably true, but only that it is part of the theory and is as much in doubt as
the empirical assertions about achievement levels. Hence it is wrong to think, as
those attempting to formulate the avoidance strategy do, that the uncertainty
surrounding the traditional theory of segregation stems from a dependence on
the outcomes of social science research.
B.

The Ineffectiveness of the Strategy

The avoidance strategy not only rests on flawed premises but is also ineffective. It does not eliminate the uncertainty introduced by the harmfulness component. I concede that if the avoidance strategy were adopted in either of its
black children and immeasurably taints the education they receive." Brunson v. Board of Trustees
of School Dist. No. 1, 429 F.2d 820, 823, 826 (4th Cir. 1970) (Sobeloff, J., concurring).
28. We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two classes stamps the colored race with a badge
of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely
because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.
163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
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guises there would no longer be a need to rely, even in part, on the outcome of
social science research aimed at determining whether segregation is harmful.
But uncertainty would still arise in determining whether segregation is harmful
or wrongful-whether it is a condition that should be corrected.
The effort to categorize segregation as a vestige of past racial assignment
seeks to capitalize on the consensus developed over the last twenty years that
racial assignment for segregative purposes is wrong. But empirical uncertainty
is introduced by the need to rely on factual assertions purporting to connect
the past with the present. The fact that these assertions try to explain the
present behavior-residential segregation-of an enormous mass of people on
the basis of a school board's past and sometimes near-ancient conduct of assigning students to racially-identifiable schools on the basis of their race, makes the
uncertainty acute. Indeed, in order to make the issues triable or capable of ever
producing relief, the Supreme Court had to create a set of presumptions in
favor of the existence of these linkages and those presumptions, especially
when viewed as a set, do not seem supported by natural probabilities.
With the other avoidance strategy, postulating an ethic that is necessarily
inconsistent with segregation, the uncertainty is introduced at the outset-the
choice of value. The traditional theory against segregation starts with a value
that is widely shared and, more important, that has a clear constitutional basis:
it is wrong to assign students in a manner which makes inferior the education
afforded to blacks. The inquiry then centers on whether the particular practice
violates that norm. The universalistic-ethic avoidance technique, however, proceeds differently. It confines the controversy to the initial choice of value,
though concededly once the ethic is adopted there is little need for further
inquiry.
Stated in its most general and abstract form, the universalistic ethic does
have great intuitive appeal. Who can be against eliminating barriers among
groups? But that is not the proper level of inquiry. The process of choosing the
ethic must be seen in its proper context, and when it is, the choice becomes
controversial. (1) Controversy will arise when we attempt to apply the ethic to a
particular social problem and to determine, for example, what "barriers" must
be eliminated. We then must face such troublesome questions as whether a
commitment to the universalistic ethic also entails a commitment to eliminating
school segregation that results from and parallels residential segregation. (2)
Controversy arises when we realize that the process of ethic adoption is a
competitive one. The question is not whether the universalistic ethic is "good"
or "appealing," but whether it is more "appealing" or "better" than those ethics
that would make us more tolerant of segregation-for example, the
community-first ethic, making it desirable to preserve the integrity of communities or neighborhoods, or the libertarian ethic, making any coercion undesirable. (3) Controversy will also arise once we insist upon a constitutional
peg for the universalistic ethic. The traditional theory against segregation fits
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within the contours of the Equal Protection Clause, viewed as a protection
against state practices that disadvantage the racial minority. But I doubt
whether this is true for the universalistic ethic since, in order to preserve its
separate identity, it cannot be reduced to a view about the betterment of the
racial minority.
These difficulties inherent in the process of ethic adoption-in deciding
whether the universalistic ethic is applicable to school segregation when linked
to residential segregation, whether it is superior to competing ethics, and
whether it is constitutionally sound-have the effect of reintroducing uncertainty into the harmfulness component. Thus, we remain as uncertain as ever
about the harmfulness or wrongfulness of school segregation. Ironically
enough, the resolution of our doubts may in part depend on empirical inquiries of a nature similar to the ones this universalistic strategy sought to
29
avoid. As Professor Yudof, author of the strategy, acknowledges:
The problem of course is that the measure and likelihood of symbolic or real
benefits [of competing ethics] are unclear, for the causal relationships are
largely unknown ....

Thus, ignorance of causal relationships, which originally

made ethical theories seem so attractive, resurfaces as an impediment to rational choice between competing ethical theories.
C.

The Price of Avoidance

Finally one can question the very purpose of any avoidance strategy. To
some degree, it may spring from the desire to obtain wider general acceptance
of the busing orders. But it remains to be seen why those decrees are entitled to
any acceptance beyond that which they can earn on their own terms. Obedience
to a decree is not a transcendental value. Once we embark on the questionable
mission of camouflaging the grounds for decision in order to enhance the basis
for its public acceptance, the possibility of a viable tradition of public accountability is seriously undercut. The strategy will also have a diversionary effect:
while obscuring the uncertainty may enhance the acceptability of the decree, it
may concurrently make the resolution of that uncertainty more unlikely. Only
when the uncertainty is faced in a direct and explicit manner will there be the
kind of investment in discussion and research that might-if anything can
-either reduce that uncertainty or determine whether this institutional criticism has any validity.
IV
THE INSTITUTIONAL CRITICISM EXAMINED

A distinction should be made between two species of the institutional
criticism-one is couched in terms of preference and the other in terms of
competence. The preference issue asks whether the judiciary, as opposed to some
29.

Yudof, supra note 25, at 463-64.
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other government agency 30 such as a legislature or school board, is the best
institution for making the decision on the merits. The competence issue asks
whether the judiciary is entitled to issue the decree. The competence critic is
willing to assume that the judiciary is the best decisional agency, or for that
matter the only one. He argues that, even on such an assumption, the judiciary
should refrain from making a decision on the merits.
A.

The Preference Issue

The preference for non-judicial institutions might be based on the view that
these institutions have superior fact-finding tools and that they thereby have
the means of eliminating a greater portion of the uncertainty. 3 t I cannot agree.
The fact-finding processes of the legislature and school board may be more
informal and more tolerant of ex parte presentations than those of a court, but
that does not make them superior for the resolution of any of the relevant
questions, including the factual ones. Some of the distinguishing features of the
judicial process-for example, the right of cross-examination-enhance rather
than impede the inquiry into the truthfulness of whatever opinions witnesses
might express.3 2 Moreover, the concept of relevancy is flexible enough to permit the judicial hearing to be as broad as the legislative inquiry; and with either
institution the ultimate decision is to be made by a non-expert. Admittedly,
some school boards may develop more familiarity with a desegregation claim
over time, but it is difficult to generalize on this score. Many school boards,
particularly the elected ones, have constantly shifting memberships. On the
other hand, many federal district judges have developed a great familiarity
with the school desegregation problems of the particular communities within
the judicial district.
30. A non-governmental institution, such as the family, might be considered as an alternative
decisional agency under a freedom-of-choice system-one in which students are assigned to schools
on the basis of their parents' choice. Parents could then judge whether the benefits to be obtained
from an integrated education were worth the attendant costs. The difficulty with this decisional
system is twofold: (a) It would result in the localization of all remedial costs on the racial
minority-which seems inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause. The only result that realistically could be contemplated is one-way busing-with some blacks choosing to go to white schools,
while a substantial proportion remain in all-black schools. A freedom-of-choice system not only
permits an informed judgment, but also choices based on prejudice; and even if this freedom were
not abused, the same pattern is likely to result. Few would claim that the education of whites would
be improved by placement in a predominantly black school. (b) There are likely to be interferences
with the choice, thus making the freedom illusory. Some interference may be retaliatory-violence,
loss of employment, hostile reception by white teachers and students. Interference may also arise
from the system itself: the decisions of some black families may tend to coerce the choice of others,
for few enjoy the feeling of isolation.
31. Yudof, supra note 25, at 413.
32. Part of the footnote eleven attack stemmed from the judicial reliance on evidence beyond
the record, and nothing I have said should be construed as condoning that practice in the busing
context. Judicial notice should be kept at a minimum. It should be permitted not simply because a
factual assertion can be classified as "legislative," but because of clear and compelling considerations of judicial administration or because the issue is not one that can be illuminated by an
evidentiary presentation.
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More probably, the preference for non-judicial institutions has an ethical
basis: the more uncertain the underlying proposition, the less appropriate it is
to impose obligations through the least representative branch. Coercion requires certitude. Decisions of those institutions more directly responsive to the
citizenry-such as the legislature or school board-seem more self-imposed,
less intrusive, less coercive, and thus are more compatible with a high degree of
uncertainty.
Stated in general terms, this argument has great appeal. But it loses some of
its force where, as in this case, the benefits of the obligation are to be primarily
conferred on a racial minority and the costs imposed on all. There the risk is
very high that the decision of the legislature or the school board may not be a
conscientious exercise of self-governance, but rather a manifestation of majority self-interest. Once account is taken of that risk, the ethical basis for prefer3
ring nonjudicial institutions is substantially weakened, if not destroyed.
Whenever a decision is entrusted to a legislature or any body directly responsible to the citizenry, the risk is high that the outcome will only manifest
the interest of the dominant group. It may therefore seem that in raising doubts
about the ethical superiority of relying on the legislature or school board,
particularly if the board is an elective one, I may also be reflecting doubt-not
widely shared-about the superiority of the democratic process in general. But
I do not believe so. Society's commitment to the ideal of self governance is not
so intense or absolute as to preclude an exception for minority rights. The
Equal Protection Clause, primarily a restraint on majoritarian action directed at
minorities, is ample evidence of that fact.
The integrity of this claimed exception to our democratic commitment depends on whether the "minority" can be defined so as not to be coextensive
with the ordinary loser of the legislative battle. Only then will the exception
not eliminate the rule. But I believe that the concept of "minority" can be so
defined, and that the racial minority should and would be included in any such
definition. The special historical position of the racial minority in this
country-two centuries as slaves and a third century as the victims of political,
33.

That is why it is ethically permissible to construe section 5 of the fourteenth amendment as

a one-edged sword:
[Section] 5 does not grant Congress power to enact "statutes so as in effect to dilute equal
protection and due process discussions of this Court." We emphasize that Congress' power
under § 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; §
5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees. Thus, for
example, an enactment authorizing the States to establish racially segregated systems of
education would not be-as required by § 5-a measure "to enforce" the Equal Protection
Clause since that clause of its own force prohibits such state laws.
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651-52 n. 10 (1968). It also explains why little deference
should be paid to the legislative judgments reflected in the recent federal anti-busing legislation
embodied in Title Ii of the Equal Education Opportunities Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C.A. 1701 (Supp.
1975). See generally Comment, Interpretingthe Anti-Busing Provisions of the Education Amendments of
1972, 10 HARV. J. LEGIS. 256 (1973); Note, Nixon Busing Bills and CongressionalPower, 81 YALE L.J.

1542 (1972).
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social, educational and economic discrimination-gave it a discrete set of interests and diminished its power in a way that cannot be corrected simply by
the extension of the franchise. That is why we needed not just the thirteenth
and fifteenth amendments, but also the fourteenth; and that is why, true to the
intent of the framers of that amendment, black citizens have long been deemed
its prime beneficiaries.
B.

The Competence Issue

The claim of institutional competence does not contend that it is better to
leave the resolution of this uncertainty to another more appropriate branch of
government, but rather that the uncertainty of the underlying proposition
makes judicial law-making illegitimate. The desegregation decree cannot properly be called "law." It is called law because it issues from a legal authority, but
it is not entitled to that status. It should not be issued by a judge.
Three different types of arguments have been made to support this claim,
all of which stem from the uncertainty of the underlying proposition.14 That
uncertainty (1) differentiates the busing decree from the usual decree issued by
a court; (2) prevents the obligation emanating from a busing decree from
attaining two characteristics deemed essential to a constitutional obligation
-timelessness and community-invariance; and (3) creates too much latitude for
the individual judge. Implicit in all three arguments is a common conception of
law, one which aspires for legal obligations and legal rules the same degree of
certainty that marks objective reality; and that is why I use the term "objectivist" to refer to the competence critic.
1. Departure From the Usual
The competence critic may allow the prevailing practices to define the appropriate bounds of proper judicial law-making and then assert that the uncertainty of the underlying proposition differentiates the busing order from other
judgments or decrees. The normative premise of this argument is obviously
troubling-I fail to see why "what is" should determine "what ought to be." But
so is the factual premise-namely, that the uncertainty of a busing decree is
"unusual."
In the typical case, there may be little doubt about the existence of harm.
But there are many exceptions-the tort suit providing recovery for injury to
reputation or for a dignitary harm is such an instance. And even where there is
no uncertainty about the harm, uncertainty is introduced in the typical case by
the need for a relational judgment. The Hand formula in torts (is the cost of
avoidance less than the discounted harm?) is such an example.3 5 So are the
34. Some of the arguments that support the competence criticism also may be used to support
the preference position; thus there is some overlap and I hope that my evaluation of an argument
in one context will carry over to the next.
35. See Conway v. O'Brien, Ill F.2d 611,612 (2d Cir. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 312 U.S. 192
(1941); United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (1947).
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recent constitutional cases declaring a right to an adversary hearing before the
termination of welfare benefits (is the increased procedural protection worth
36
In these cases, the uncertainty is
the diminution of substantive benefits?).
than the harmfulness one, but
rather
introduced by the relational component
the precise point at which this uncertainty interjects itself does not seem significant. One might argue that there is more uncertainty inherent in the proposition underlying a school decree than in the comparable propositions of
these other cases to which I have referred. But without having some way of
measuring the amount of uncertainty, it is impossible to give that claim much
3

weight.
2.

1

Departure From the Ideal

Alternatively, the objectivist may postulate the proper characteristics of a
legal or constitutional obligation, and then express a dissatisfaction with the
obligation emanating from a busing decree because it does not incorporate
those features. It is not uncertainty itself but the very basis of decision-the
underlying proposition-that prevents the attainment of them. Uncertainty is
antithetical to the postulated characteristics and arises from that decisional
predicate. As the uncertainty becomes more pronounced so do the limitations
of that predicate and the unlikelihood of achieving the ideal of the objectivist.
One characteristic postulated by the objectivist is permanence or neartimelessness. The obligation of a busing decree is time bound. It may cease to
exist if, as the argument is stated, the latest social science experiment demon38
A second
strates that segregation is not harmful or not "that" harmful.
characteristic postulated by the objectivist is community-invariance. If the obligation is dependent on assessment-at this time and in this place-of the
harmfulness of segregation and of the remedial costs, a school board in one
community may have an obligation to eliminate the segregation either because,
given the general social setting, segregation is particularly harmful, or because,
36. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
37. In this context, a confession of Justice Cardozo seems appropriate:
I was much troubled in spirit, in my first years upon the bench, to find how trackless was
the ocean on which I had embarked. I sought for certainty. I was oppressed and disheartened when I found that the quest for it was futile. I was trying to reach land, the solid
land of fixed and settled rules, the paradise of a justice that would declare itself by tokens
plainer and more commanding than its pale and glimmering reflections in my own vacilAs the years have gone by, and as I have reflected more
lating mind and conscience ....
and more upon the nature of the judicial process, I have become reconciled to the uncertainty, because I have grown to see it as inevitable.
B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 166 (1921).
38. This proposition is suggested by Edmund Cahn's well-known comment:
I would not have the constitutional rights of Negroes-or of other Americans-rest on any
such flimsy foundation as some of the scientific demonstrations in these records ....
[S]ince the behavioral sciences are so very young, imprecise, and changeful. their findings
have an uncertain expectancy of life. Today's sanguine asseveration may be cancelled by
tomorrow's new revelation-or new technical fad. It is one thing to use the current scien-
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given the geographic configurations, it is easier to correct. A school board in
another community, on the other hand, may well not have such an obligation. 9
It is not a sufficient response to the objectivist to produce counter-examples
by pointing to existing instances of a legal or constitutional obligation which
do not meet the two postulated criteria. The objectivist's answer would be that
these counter-examples, like the obligation imposed by a desegregation decree, are not properly "law." Nevertheless the existence of these counter-examples is not without some ethical significance. The objectivist must explain
why his notion of law should be applied to the duty to desegregate and not
to the counter-examples. Without an explanation, it appears as though a double standard is being applied.
The objectivist might explain that his standard is being applied to busing
decrees only as a starting point, and that in time it will be applied to all the
counter-examples. The sufficiency of that explanation, of course, depends
upon the sincerity of the commitment to apply the standard thoroughly to all
other situations where legal or constitutional obligations are predicated on a
comparable proposition. Without that commitment, the explanation is wanting. However, with it, the full sweep of the institutional criticism becomes
apparent, and that in turn may cause one to recoil. One might accept the objectivist standard if it is to be applied to one corner of the law, the duty to desegregate, but not if it meant a wholesale rejection of commonly acknowledged
legal obligations.
Aside from the problem of using a double standard in different areas of the
law and of applying the higher standard only to the duty to desegregate, the
value preference inherent in the objectivist position should be made explicit:
the good to be achieved by confining legal obligations to those that meet the
criteria of objectivity is greater than the good to be achieved by imposing a duty
to desegregate. This value preference is, of course, not a flaw in the objectivist's
position; but the explication of the preference does illustrate what is entailed in
accepting that position. It also shows that one can reject the position either by
(a) denying that the law-notion desired by the objectivist is good at all, or by (b)
claiming that the good to be achieved by the duty to desegregate outweighs the
evil that might be involved in imposing a legal obligation that cannot achieve
tific findings, however ephemeral they may be, in order to ascertain whether the legislature has acted reasonably in adopting some scheme of social or economic regulation;
deference here is shown not so much to the findings as to the legislature. It would be quite
another thing to have our fundamental rights rise, fall, or change along with the latest
fashions of psychological literature.
Cahn, jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 150, 157-58, 167 (1955). For a general consideration of
timelessness value, see Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time
and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1965).

39. This was first suggested in a discussion with Professor Alexander M. Bickel, during which
he criticized the approach to de facto school desegregation that I had first articulated in Racial
Imbalance in the Public Schools: The ConstitutionalConcepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564 (1965). In retrospect,
it isnot clear to me whether Professor Bickel was making a competence or a preference argument.
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the criteria postulated by the objectivist. (A commitment to position (a) also
includes a commitment to position (b), but not the other way around.)
Either of these anti-objectivist positions is logically coherent, and I believe
that both positions are more attractive than that of the objectivist. This assertion is not predicated on a belief in the overwhelming good to be achieved by
desegregation-a belief that I remain dubious about and that would, in any
event, only support the second, more limited position. Instead, it is based on
the view that the aspirations of the objectivist are ill-founded, that the postulated characteristics are not an ideal. They are not an evil, but neither are they
a good. We should not in the least be concerned by our failure to attain them.
I fail to see any value to be served by having timeless legal obligations. Of
course, if I have a right today, I would hate for the court to decide
tomorrow-having, for example, changed its view about the harmfulness of
segregation-that I no longer have that right. But I am objecting to the merits
of the decision-the denial of the right-and not the fact that the right was so
short lived. If the court is correct in deciding that segregation is not harmful,
then the right should cease to exist. Similarly, one can complain if the determination of rights turns on the results of the most recent social science study,
such as, for example, a study which measures the impact of segregation on
achievement levels. But once again, the objection here is to the basis of the
decision-the harmfulness of segregation is denied on the basis of one study
which may be methodologically flawed and which, in any event, only measures
one possible type of harm. The force of the complaint does not derive from
the fact that the right is short-lived.
In this context, the goal of timelessness is not rooted in the norm of consistency nor in the norm of protecting reasonable expectations (the norms underlying the doctrine of stare decisis). By hypothesis, the predicate for change
lies in the assessment a judge makes of the harmfulness of segregation or of
the remedial costs. That means that the change does not violate the norm of
consistency; the case is no longer a like case, and hence need not have the
same outcome.
Attention to the predicate of the change also bears on the problem of
disappointment. What one is entitled to expect in the future is not the imposition of the obligation to desegregate, but rather that an obligation will be
imposed if segregation is deemed sufficiently harmful to warrant the remedial
costs. Stare decisis attaches to the rule rather than its applications, and a context where there is little need for predictability, there is no evil in permitting
that rule to be stated at a high level of generality or abstractness.
A similar point can be made with the demand that the legal obligation be
community-invariant-that a practice held unconstitutional shall be deemed
unconstitutional throughout the United States. The ideal of a uniform, nationwide rule follows from the notion of a single constitution for the entire nation.
But we must be careful about what has to be uniform. It is not that the
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percentage of white and black students in each class must be exactly the same,
or even that there shall be no all-black schools in the United States. Instead,
what is constitutionally mandated is the uniformity of the rule of law. That rule
can be stated with a high degree of generality: whenever segregation is deemed
sufficiently harmful to warrant the remedial costs, an obligation will be imposed to eliminate it. There may be a natural tendency to gravitate away from
such an abstract statement of the rule and to search for a more concrete one;
for example, there shall be no all-black schools. But that tendency, regardless
of how natural it might be, cannot be rooted in the theory of a "single constitution." The Constitution does not establish the appropriate degree of abstractness. Once severed from its constitutional roots, the community-invariant ideal
is thus as unappealing as the alleged ideal of timelessness.
3.

Permitting Excessive Latitude

Finally, there is the problem of judicial abuse. The objectivist may complain,
not about the qualities of the obligation, but about the risk of a judge deciding
the case on the basis of his personal bias rather than on the merits. Arguably,
this risk arises from two circumstances: (a) the underlying proposition gives the
judge great latitude, and (b) the truth value of that proposition is so much in
doubt that the controlling institutions-appellate courts or citizen-criticshave no basis for scrutinizing an individual judge's decision-anything he
says goes.
I doubt, however, whether we have reached this situation. The truth value
of the underlying proposition may be uncertain, but not that uncertain. Moreover, in assessing this objection, it is important to separate, on the one hand,
the alleged evil of judicial latitude itself and, on the other hand, our views
about the merits of the case. Very often an objection to judicial latitude or discretion springs from a prediction as to how this power will be used, and from
an implicit value preference as to what is a right decision. Usually we object
to judicial latitude because we fear it might not be exercised in the manner
that we deem proper. For example, our views about the permissibility of the
pardoning power-to take the most discretionary power-in large part depends on whether we believe it will be used to dispense mercy to the weak or
unfortunate or whether it will be used to dispense favors to the politically rich
and powerful. The judicial latitude itself is in large part ethically neutral.
One evil can, nevertheless, be tied to judicial latitude or discretion and that
is the increased likelihood of a differential decisional pattern that cannot be
explained in terms of the governing rule of law. The greater the latitude left to
individual judges and the less central the control, the more non-rule-based
diversity in outcome is likely to result. The segregation of two communities
might be identical in every relevant respect (i.e., in the harm and the remedial
costs); yet an obligation to desegregate is imposed in one but not in the other.
The only explanation is the difference in the judges.
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I readily admit this decisional pattern offends my sense of equal treatment
and the idea of a single constitution. But the objectivist not only wants to
eliminate this pattern; he also wants to eliminate judicial latitude altogether-either by denying the courts the power to decide the merits at all or by
establishing a per se rule. This position is based in part on two premises: (a) a
differential decisional pattern flows from the fact that the judiciary has wide
latitude, and (b) the pattern cannot easily be eliminated by the ordinary
methods of appellate review. I am willing to accept both premises, but still not
accept the objectivist conclusion which fails to take sufficient account of the
price to be paid by the elimination of judicial latitude. The differential decisional pattern would be avoided, but only at the cost of forcing us to live with
an indeterminate number of decisions or outcomes in school cases that are
necessarily incorrect.
Suppose, for example, judicial latitude were abolished by establishing a per
se rule always requiring the elimination of segregation-that there can be no
all-black schools in America. Then the differential pattern would be eliminated,
but at the expense of requiring busing in some situations where none should be
required. Or suppose that the per se rule that the objectivist wants to establish
required the school boards to stop making racial assignments but never required them to eliminate segregation. Once again the differential pattern
would be eliminated, but at the expense of withholding relief when it is due.
Recognition of either contingency is a sufficient basis for parting company
with the objectivist. But, quite frankly, it is the second contingency that gives
me the greatest pause, for two reasons. First, it is the contingency most likely to
materialize: such a prophecy is based on the fact that we are dealing with the
claim of the racial minority, and that the decisional power is generally in the
hands of members of the dominant racial class and thus sensitive to the interests of that class. It is not realistic to expect elites-even judicial ones-to be
too counter-majoritarian. Second, the kind of erroneous decision produced

under the second contingency-no remedial obligation even when one should
be imposed-is no ordinary mistake. It is, by definition, a denial of a constitutional right. The concept of a single national constitution (or the Equal Protection Clause itself) may give a constitutional basis to the value of eliminating the
differential decisional pattern. But the desegregation claim is also based on the
Constitution and there is no basis for preferring the constitutional value of
singleness over the constitutional value of not disadvantaging blacks.

